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CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES

CPLR 214-a: Appellate Division, Third Department holds that a
surgical suture negligently placed in a patient's body in the
course of an operation is a "foreign object" so as to toll the statute of limitations
Public concern beginning in the mid-1970s over the medical
malpractice crisis1 prompted the New York Legislature to respond
with various tort reform measures.2 The earliest of these reforms
'See Russell S. Schwartzman, Note, Orderlies in the Court? A Proposalfor the Proper
Designation of Medical Malpractice Claims, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 287, 287-90 (1986). The
crisis witnessed an unprecedented increase in insurance premiums, the withdrawal of many
insurance carriers from the medical malpractice insurance market, a rise in the number of
medical malpractice claims, and an increase in the size of medical malpractice damage
awards. Id. The effect of such conditions was to seriously threaten the availability of health
care services. See Betsy A. Rosen, Note, The 1985 Medical Malpractice Reform Act: The
New York State Legislature Responds to the Medical Malpractice Crisis With a Prescription for Comprehensive Reform, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 135, 137-44 (1986). The last two decades
have been characterized by double- and triple-digit percentage increases in malpractice premiums. See Phillip S. Gutis, MalpracticeRates Ease, But Many are Skeptical, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 1989, at A24. In 1985, the crisis led to physician work stoppages and slowdowns
across upstate New York. See Edward A. Gargan, Governor Approves Bill to Reduce Malpractice-InsurancePremiums, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1985, at B20. In fact, dozens of doctors,
particularly specialists, "announced that they would cease practice or confine themselves to
less-risky specialties." Id. But see Gutis, supra (statistics of 1988 show dramatic drop in
number of medical malpractice cases filed in New York).
The medical malpractice crisis has not been limited to New York but is perceived as a
national problem. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973) (outlining
severity of malpractice crisis in United States). While there was only one claim per 37 physicians in 1968, by 1975 there was one claim for every eight physicians. See Johnson, et al., A
Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1373 (1989). Between 1975 and 1985 the average medical malpractice
jury award increased from $220,018 to $1,017,716. Id. Moreover, between 1960 and 1970
surgeon's premium rates increased approximately 940% and in some states, the premiums
increased 100% between 1974 and 1975. See Thomas L. Stachler, Note, Repose vs. Right-toa-Remedy: Physician vs. Patient Under the Ohio Constitution, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 423, 425
(1988). But see Richard C. Turkington, Constitutional Limitations on Tort Reform: Have
the State Courts Placed Insurmountable Obstacles in the Path of Legislative Responses to
the Perceived Liability Insurance Crisis? 32 VILL. L. REV. 1299, 1299-300 & n.3 (1983) (discussing congressional reports and other forums that questioned bona fide nature of supposed crisis).
2 See infra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing various provisions enacted in New
York to assess and counter medical malpractice crisis). The majority of states in the 1970s
had also undergone a medical malpractice crisis which prompted legislative responses to
remedy the situation. See, e.g., California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, ch. 2,
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was the enactment of CPLR 214-a, 3 which provided that a medical
malpractice suit be commenced within two years and six months
from the time of the alleged malpractice. 4 The legislature has provided certain specific exceptions, including the codification of the
"foreign object" doctrine. Under this exception, when a foreign
2d Extra Sess., § 1.192, [1975] West's Cal. Legis. Service No. 9, at 3809 (codified at CAL. CIv.
PRO. CODE § 340.5) (shortening statute of limitations); Medical Malpractice Reform Act, ch.
75-79, § 7, [1975] West's Fla. Sess. Law Service No. 1, at 13 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §
95.11(4)) (same). See generally John H. French, Florida Departs From Tradition:The Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 423 (1978) (analyzing scope of malpractice crisis in Florida and effectiveness of legislative response).
' See CPLR 214-a (McKinney 1990). CPLR 214-a provides, in relevant part:
An action for medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice must be commenced within
two years and six months of the act, omission or failure complained of or last
treatment . . . however . . . where the action is based upon the discovery of a
foreign object in the body of the patient, the action may be commenced within
one year of the date of such discovery or of the date of discovery of facts which
would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier.... For the purpose
of this section the term "foreign object" shall not include a chemical compound,
fixation device or prosthetic aid or device.
Id.
The enactment of CPLR 214-a was preceded by a thorough assessment of the state of
the health care industry. See Governor's Memoranda, Medical Malpractice, reprinted in
[1975] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 225. "The purpose of the Governor's Program Bill is to deal comprehensively with the critical threat to the health and welfare of the State by way of diminished delivery of health care services as a result of the lack of adequate medical malpractice
insurance coverage at reasonable rates." Id. In addition to a revised statute of limitations,
the bill included: 1) significant changes in the substantive law of torts and authorization of
the promulgation of court rules and procedures to assure prompt and fair disposition of
medical malpractice claims; 2) establishment of a Medical Malpractice Insurance Association to supply malpractice insurance should such insurance be unavailable in the voluntary
market; and 3) providing improved procedures for professional discipline of doctors. Id.
Further legislation was enacted in 1985 with the Medical Reform Act which provided: 1)
periodic payments of large future awards; 2) reduced contingency fees; 3) broadened recognition of other available sources of plaintiff compensation; 4) sanctions against frivolous
claims and defenses; and 5) mandated hospital malpractice prevention and physician privilege review procedures. See Medical Malpractice Reform Act, ch. 294, [1985] N.Y. Laws 685
(McKinney); see also Gutis, supra note 1 (discussing enactment of Medical Reform Act).
' See supra note 3 (relevant section of CPLR 214-a regarding actual time period involved in statute of limitations). Prior to CPLR 214-a, the statute of limitations was three
years for a medical malpractice claim. See Mirabile v. Profy, 172 A.D.2d 729, 730, 569
N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (2d Dep't 1991); Conklin v. Draper, 229 A.D. 227, 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529, 529
aff'd 254 N.Y. 620, 620, 173 N.E. 892, 892 (1930). CPLR 214-a simply codified the case law
with respect to when a cause of action accrues. See e.g., Dobbins v. Clifford, 39 A.D.2d 1, 23, 330 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745-46 (4th Dep't 1972) (setting forth general rule and recognized exceptions as developed in courts); Flanagan v. Mount Eden General Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427,
431, 248 N.E.2d 871, 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 27 (1969) (establishing "foreign object" exception
subsequently codified by CPLR 214-a).
See generally supra note 3 and accompanying text (stating provisions and legislative
history of CPLR 214-a). The foreign object rule was first developed in New York in Flana-
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object is negligently left within a patient's body, the statute of limitations is tolled until the foreign object has been or reasonably
should have been discovered ("discovery rule").' The exception is a
limited one, and CPLR 214-a specifically excludes fixation devices 7
from the definition of "foreign objects." 8 Recently, however, the
Appellate Division, Third Department, in Rockefeller v. Moront,9
held that a suture-a fixation device-inserted into a patient during the course of an operation was a foreign object within the
gan v. Mount Eden General Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
In Flanagan,the patient underwent an operation in 1958 for a gall bladder ailment. Id. at
428, 248 N.E.2d at 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 24. The surgeon failed to remove surgical clamps
used in the operation. Id. In 1966, eight years after the surgery, the plaintiff experienced
abdominal pain and upon an examination, the clamps were discovered. Id. The plaintiff
filed a malpractice claim and the defendant moved for dismissal on the grounds that the
statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 428-29, 248 N.E.2d at 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 24-25.
The Court, in denying the defendant's motion, held that the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until discovery of the clamps, based on the notion that the clamps were "foreign object[s]." Id. at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27; see also Richard T. Farrell, New York Civil Practice, Statute of Limitations, 418 PLI/LIT 37 (1991) (discussing
provisions of CPLR 214-a).
The Flanagan rule was motivated in part by four considerations: 1) discovery of the
wrong was very difficult; 2) there was no question regarding professional diagnostic judgment or credential issues; 3) there was no danger of a frivolous claim; and 4) there was
objective evidence that a tort had been committed. Flanagan, 24 N.Y.2d at 430-31, 248
N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26; see also CPLR 214-a, commentary C214-a:3 at 603 (McKinney 1990) (outlining reasons in support of "foreign object" exception).
The courts also carved out an additional exception known as the "continuous treatment" doctrine. See Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 187 N.E.2d 777, 778,
237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1962). The doctrine was later codified in CPLR 214-a which provided that "[a]n action . . . must be commenced within two years and six months of
the . . . last treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or
condition which gave rise to the said act, omission or failure." CPLR 214-a (McKinney
1990). Furthermore, in situations in which a person is under a disability due to infancy or
insanity at the time of accrual, the statute of limitations may be tolled until the disability
ends. See CPLR 208 (McKinney 1990).
The purpose of the these exceptions was to lessen the harsh results that the general rule
of the statute of limitation would otherwise impose on a plaintiff. See Jocelyn B. Lamm,
Note, Easy Access to the Courts for Incest Victims: Toward an Equitable Application of
the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100 YALE L.J. 2189, 2192 (1991); cf. Carl M. Wagner, Comment, U.S. v. Kubrick, Scope and Application, 120 MIL. L. REV. 139, 154-55 (1988) (discussing need to expand discovery rule of medical malpractice to other tort claims).
I See Flanagan,24 N.Y.2d at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27; CPLR 214-a
commentary C214-a:3 at 603 (McKinney 1990) (foreign object exception in CPLR 214-a
codified Flanaganholding); cf. Weber v. Scheer, 58 A.D.2d 520, 520, 395 N.Y.S.2d 183, 184
(1st Dep't 1977) (exception inapplicable because foreign object not involved).
7 See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 425, 521 (25th ed. 1990).
8 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
182 A.D.2d 160, 587 N.Y.S.2d 48 (3d Dep't 1992).
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meaning of CPLR 214-a.10
In Rockefeller, the plaintiff instituted a medical malpractice
action alleging that the defendant physician's negligent placement
of a suture was the proximate cause of his sterility. 1 In 1971, when
the plaintiff was four years old, he underwent a hernia operation
performed by the defendant.12 The defendant negligently sutured
the plaintiff's vas deferens' 3 leaving the suture in the plaintiff's
body.14 In 1988, the plaintiff was married and attempted to have a
child with his wife. When the couple was unable to conceive, the
plaintiff underwent an examination during which it was determined that his semen contained no sperm.' 5 Exploratory surgery
revealed the negligently placed suture, which confirmed the cause
6
of the plaintiff's sterility.
The plaintiff filed a complaint in 1989 shortly after the discovery of the suture.17 The defendant subsequently moved to dismiss
the complaint arguing that the malpractice claim was barred by
the statute of limitations 8 since eighteen years had elapsed between the time of the alleged malpractice and the time of the complaint.' 9 The Supreme Court, Columbia County, denied the deId. at 163, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
Id. at 161, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 49. In addition to the physician, the hospital in which the
surgery was performed was named as a defendant. Id.
2 Id. The operation was a left hernia repair known as a herniorrhaphy. Id.
" Id. The vas deferens is a secretory duct of the testicle, "running from the epididymis,
of which it is the continuation, to the prostatic urethra where it terminates as the ejaculatory duct." See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL

DICTIONARY,

supra note 7, at 470.

Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 161, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
Id. The subsequent medical treatment of the plaintiff was performed by a different
physician than the one who had sutured the vas deferens. Id.
16 Id. In a sworn statement, the doctor, who examined and operated on the plaintiff in
1988, stated that the suture's placement on the plaintiff's vas deferens "is not usually, normally or customarily involved" in the type of surgery performed on plaintiff. Id. at 163, 587
N.Y.S.2d at 50. An attempt to repair the damage caused by the suture proved unsuccessful.
Id. at 161, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
1" Id. The plaintiff filed his complaint within one year of the discovery of the suture
pursuant to the discovery rule of CPLR 214-a. Id.; see also supra note 3 and accompanying
text (section of CPLR 214-a relating to one year time limit). The plaintiff sought damages
for his sterility and emotional distress. Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 161, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
In addition, the plaintiff's wife filed a complaint against the defendant stating a derivative
cause of action. Id. The court dismissed the wife's complaint. Id. at 161-62, 587 N.Y.S.2d at
49.
'" Id. at 161, 587 N.Y.S.2d
at 49. The defendant also moved to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. Id.
19 Id. Since the claim arose prior to July 1, 1975, the effective date of CPLR 214-a, the
statute of limitations was three years and not two years and six months. See CPLR 214(6)
(prior statute of limitations for medical malpractice); see also supra note 2 (setting forth
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fendant's motion" based on its conclusion that the misplaced
suture was a foreign object within the meaning of CPLR 214-a 21
and the statute of limitations for the plaintiff's cause of action had
thus not expired.22
The Appellate Division, Third Department, in a 3-2 decision,
affirmed the judgment of the supreme court.23 Writing for the majority, Justice Yesawich reasoned that since the suture was not inserted for any proper medical purpose, but rather by mistake, "its
placement in plaintiff's body was never intended" and it thus "became a foreign object immediately after its insertion.

' 24

In support

of its decision, the court distinguished a 1990 Court of Appeals
case, Rodriguez v. Manhattan Medical Group,25 which held that
an intra-uterine device was not a foreign object. 26 Rather, Justice
relevant text of CPLR 214-a). The distinction is irrelevant since the six month difference in
the statutes was not a factor in Rockefeller. See Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 161, 587
N.Y.S.2d at 49.
20 Id. at 162, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
21 Id. Although the claim arose prior to the effective date of CPLR 214-a, the court was
bound by the legislative intent of what constitutes a foreign object. See id. at 164, 587
N.Y.S.2d at 51 (Mikoll, J., dissenting); accord Lombardi v. DeLuca, 130 A.D.2d 632, 632,
515 N.Y.S.2d 811, 812 (2d Dep't 1987), aff'd, 71 N.Y.2d 838, 522 N.E.2d 1055, 527 N.Y.S.2d
757 (1988); Mitchell v. Abitol, 130 A.D.2d 633, 633-34, 515 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811 (2d Dep't
1987).
22 Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 161-62, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 49. The court also determined
that sterility is a compensable injury. Id. at 162, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
13 See id. at 164, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
"2See id. at 162, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
25 77 N.Y.2d 217, 567 N.E.2d 235, 566 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1990).
20 See id. at 222, 567 N.E.2d at 238, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 193. In Rodriguez, the plaintiff
had an intra-uterine device (IUD) inserted into her uterus in 1980 as a birth control device.
Id. at 219, 567 N.E.2d at 236, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 194. Two years later the plaintiff visited a
doctor to have the IUD removed. Id. The doctor failed to locate the IUD and informed the
plaintiff that she could attempt to conceive without the need for any further medical treatment. Id. The plaintiff failed to become pregnant over the next three years, and in 1986 she
experienced heavy vaginal bleeding. Id. An examination revealed the presence of the IUD
embedded in her uterus wall. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the case did not fall within
the discovery rule in CPLR 214-a, but rather was a case "no different from any other medical malpractice action in which it is claimed that a physician negligently failed to detect a
condition within the patient's body requiring treatment or surgical removal." Id. at 224, 567
N.E.2d at 239, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
The Rockefeller court distinguished the Rodriguez decision by holding that: 1) Rockefeller was not an attempt to "transform" a deliberately fixed device into a foreign object; 2)
the plaintiff in Rockefeller sought recovery against the doctor who inserted the device while
the plaintiff in Rodriguez sought recovery from the doctor who subsequently failed to remove the device; 3) there was no evidence that the suture had any specific medical purpose
while the IUD when originally inserted was used as a valid contraceptive; 4) there was no
chain of causation or credibility problems and no question regarding professional diagnostic
judgment or discretion in Rockefeller while those issues were at the very heart of Rodriguez;
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Yesawich noted, the suture at issue was analogous to the surgical
clamp left within the plaintiff in Flanaganv. Mount Eden General
Hospital,2 7 the seminal case for the foreign object doctrine.2 8 Based
on its interpretation of Flanagan,and in light of the "harsh consequences" that a contrary decision "would visit on the injured
plaintiff," the court determined that its recognition of the suture
as a foreign object did not undermine the purpose of CPLR 21429

a.

Writing for the Rockefeller dissent, Justice Mikoll protested
that the court's holding was an impermissible judicial expansion of
the foreign object doctrine in that CPLR 214-a "specifically excluded fixation devices from the 'foreign object' exception. ' 30 The
dissent further noted that the adoption of CPLR 214-a prevented
the expansion, attempted by lower courts, of the narrow holding of
3 ' Interpreting the Rodriguez case, 2 Justice Mikoll conFlanagan.
and, finally, 5) unlike Rodriguez, there was no present danger of "bringing virtually all medical malpractice cases under the discovery rule." Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 163, 587
N.Y.S.2d at 50. Based on these circumstances, the court concluded that the "burden of defending a 'stale' claim is not sufficient justification for the harsh consequences that [dismissal] would visit on the injured plaintiff." Id.
27 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
2 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. The Rockefeller court drew its analogy to
Flanagan by stating that: 1) the placement of both the suture and the surgical clamps were
unintentional acts; 2) the plaintiffs in both cases sought recovery from the doctor who negligently inserted the device; 3) both the placement of the suture and the continued presence
of the clamps were not for any specific medical treatment. Furthermore, in neither was the
defendant's ability to defend a "stale" claim impeded. Compare Flanagan, 24 N.Y.2d at
431, 248 N.E. 2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27 (finding no impairment of ability to defend)
with Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 163, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 50 (same).
29 See Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 163, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
"0See Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 164, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 51 (Mikoll, J., dissenting). Justice Mercure joined in the dissent. Id. at 165, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
" Id.; see also Flanagan, 24 N.Y.2d at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27
(finding surgical clamps were foreign objects since unintentionally left within plaintiff's
body). Many courts since Flanagan have followed this narrow holding by limiting the exception only to situations in which objects were unintentionally left inside the body. See, e.g.,
Beary v. City of Rye, 44 N.Y. 2d 398, 415, 377 N.E.2d 453, 459, 406 N.Y.S.2d 9, 15 (1978)
("[1]egislature left us no room but to conclude that it intended that Flanagannot be broadened beyond its existing confines") rev'g, Smalls v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,
55 A.D.2d 537, 537, 389 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (1st Dep't 1976) (extending Flanagan despite
acknowledgement that "case is not truly one concerning a 'foreign object' "), and rev'g,
Merced v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 56 A.D.2d 553, 554, 391 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864
(1st Dep't 1977) (following Smalls); Famulare v. Huntington Hosp., 78 A.D.2d 547, 547, 432
N.Y.S.2d 33, 33-34 (2d Dep't 1980) (holding broken tooth not foreign object pursuant to
holding in Flanagan);see also CPLR 214-a commentary at 61 (McKinney supp. 1993) (discussing case law development limiting Flanaganto its facts).
2 See Rodriguez, 77 N.Y.2d at 222, 567 N.E.2d at 238, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 196. In its
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tended that Flanaganis now limited "to cases where an object is

'accidentally ... left inside the patient's body at the time of sur-

gery and not where the object is deliberately, albeit negligently,
placed in the patient."33 It was Justice Mikoll's position, therefore,
that legislative intent compelled the court not to expand the for34
eign object exception beyond the narrow confines of Flanagan.
It is submitted that by recognizing a surgical suture as a foreign object, the Rockefeller decision runs contrary to both the express language of CPLR 214-a and the obvious policy determination of the legislature to ease the medical malpractice insurance
crisis. While the court recognized the express statutory language
stating that fixation devices, including sutures, were excluded from
the meaning of "foreign object,""5 it nevertheless determined the
exclusion was inapplicable because the suture was not for any
proper medical purpose and thus "was never intended.

3

6

It ap-

holding that an IUD was not a foreign object, the Rodriguez court invalidated the theory
known as "transformation," which, the court explained, allows a properly inserted object,
such as an IUD, to take on the character of a foreign object by virtue of the failure to
remove it in a timely fashion. Id.; see also Darragh v. County of Nassau, 91 Misc.2d 53, 55,
397 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, 1977), aff'd, 63 A.D.2d 1010, 405 N.Y.S.2d
1020 (2d Dep't 1978) ("[c]ourt is hard pressed to perceive how two IUDs can be said to
belong in the body"); Sternberg v. Gardstein, 120 A.D.2d 93, 97, 508 N.Y.S.2d 14, 17 (2d
Dep't 1986) ("[T]he IUD which the defendant failed to remove from the plaintiff's body
does constitute a foreign object as contemplated by CPLR 214-a and the case law .... ").
The lower courts that had adhered to the "transformation" theory determined that "the
first IUD became, or took on the character of, a 'foreign object' because it then had no
function to perform, no longer belonged in the body, and should have been removed as
expected by the patient." Darragh,63 A.D.2d at 1012, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
11 Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 165, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 51 (Mikoll, J., dissenting) (quoting
Rodriguez, 77 N.Y.2d at 220, 567 N.E.2d at 237, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 195); accord Lombardi, 130
A.D.2d 632, 632, 515 N.Y.S.2d 811, 812 ("[Sluture material, intentionally placed in the body
. . . does not constitute a foreign object."), aff'd, 71, N.Y.2d 838, 522 N.E.2d 1055, 527
N.Y.S.2d 757 (1988); Ruane v. Niagara Falls Memorial Medical Ctr., 91 A.D.2d 1176, 1177,
459 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (4th Dep't 1983) (burr hole covers used to fill drilled section of skull
not foreign object), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 908, 458 N.E.2d 1253, 470 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1983); Daniec
v. Synthes Ltd., 110 A.D.2d 675, 677, 487 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (2d Dep't 1985) (fixation plate
inserted near elbow not foreign object).
1 See Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 164, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 51 (Mikoll, J., dissenting); see
also CPLR 214-a commentary at 603-04 (McKinney 1990) (explaining requirements for applicability of foreign object rule pursuant to language of Flanagan).
11 Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 162, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 49 ("We recognize that '[a] fixation
device, [including] suture material, intentionallyplaced in the [patient's] body' does not
constitute a 'foreign object .... '") (quoting Lombardi, 130 A.D.2d at 632, 515 N.Y.S.2d at
812).
." Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 162, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 49. The court asserted that the
placement of the suture was a mistake and the case therefore resembled the facts in Flanagan. Id. The court expressed the opinion that since the suture's placement on the vas defer-
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pears the majority concluded that a medical act would be deemed
unintentional so long as the act was a deviation from proper medical procedure, and therefore would result in the creation of a "foreign object" for the purposes of CPLR 214-a.3 7 This conversion of
an intentional act into an unintentional act is purely semantical.
The surgeon deliberately, albeit mistakenly, placed the suture on
the vas deferens and did not intend to remove it, thus the suture
was not a "foreign object" in the plaintiff's body. s
The enactment of CPLR 214-a was a direct result of the explosion of medical malpractice claims in New York which had
driven malpractice insurance premiums to unprecedented levels.39
The clear intent of the New York State Legislature in enacting legislation such as CPLR 214-a was to restrict malpractice claims in
order to stabilize insurance premiums.40 The majority's decision,
ens was "not usually, normally or customarily" part of such an operation, it could not have

been intended. Id. at 163, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
" Id. In support of its contention that the case at hand posed no danger of bringing all
medical malpractice cases within the scope of the discovery rule, the court limited its holding to "instances where a physician introduces into a patient's body an object-including a
suture to an organ not involved in the medical procedure performed-which is not intended
to remain there." Id.
'" See CPLR 214-a commentary at 603 (McKinney 1990). A foreign object is one the
doctor doesn't intend to leave in the body, so if a doctor sutures a wound with thread that is
composed of inappropriate material, that suture will not become a foreign object. Id. The
rule that the foreign object exception is inapplicable in cases in which an object is intentionally placed in the patient's body has been followed by a majority of courts. See, e.g., Lombardi, 130 A.D.2d 632, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 812 (2d Dep't 1987) (involving suture material used
in surgery), aff'd, 71 N.Y.2d 838, 522 N.E.2d 1055, 527 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1988); Mitchell v.
Abitol, 130 A.D.2d 633, 633-34, 515 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811 (2d Dep't 1987) (suture material used
in Caesarean section); Ruane v. Niagara Falls Memorial Medical Ctr., 91 A.D.2d 1176, 1177,
459 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (4th Dep't 1983) (burr hole cover used in skull), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 908,
458 N.E.2d 1253, 470 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1983); Cooper v. Edinbergh, 75 A.D.2d 757, 758, 427
N.Y.S.2d 810, 811 (1st Dep't 1980) (suture material used in appendectomy); Weber v.
Scheer, 58 A.D.2d 520, 520, 395 N.Y.S.2d 183, 184 (1st Dep't 1977) (prosthetic device used
in plaintiff's ear). See generally SIEGEL § 42 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1992) (stating that device
intentionally left in patient's body would not fall under discovery accrual rule). But see
Vinciguerra v. Jameson, 153 A.D.2d 452, 551 N.Y.S.2d 691 (3d Dep't 1990). In Vinciguerra,
the same department that decided Rockefeller held that hemoclips (small metallic devices
used to control bleeding during surgery) were foreign objects. Id. at 455, 551 N.Y.S.2d at
693. The court held this despite the fact that the hemoclips were intentionally attached to
the plaintiff's ureter instead of the blood vessel. Id. at 453, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 692. The validity
of this decision, however, is questionable in light of the Rodriguez decision in the same year.
See Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 164, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 51 (Mikoll, J., dissenting). Justice
Mikoll contended that the application of Flanaganshould not be expanded and therefore
concluded that Vinciguerra "has no further validity." Id. at 165, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
11 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing medical malpractice crisis in
New York).
40 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing origin and development of
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allowing a fixation device intentionally placed in a patient's body
to be termed a "foreign object" for purposes of tolling the statute
of limitations, undermines this intent. It is further contended that
contrary to Justice Yesawich's assertion, this decision has the potential of "bringing virtually all medical malpractice cases under
the discovery rule. '4 1 Under the Rockefeller rule every misplaced
suture becomes a foreign object. The issue of medical malpractice
is highly complex; thus, expansion of the foreign object exception
should be made by the legislature, rather than the judiciary, since
the former is in a better position to evaluate the consequences of
any change.4 2
CPLR 214-a). Judge McLaughlin explains in his practice commentary that the enactment of
this section was the culmination of a battle between doctors, lawyers, insurance companies,
and the legislature. CPLR 214-a commentary at 592 (McKinney 1990). Given the rise in
malpractice claims, the objective of CPLR 214-a's enactment was to "limit both the number
and size of malpractice judgments." Id.
CPLR 214-a reduced the statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions from
three years to two years and six months in an effort to decrease rising claims. See id. Moreover, the limited definition of the term "foreign object" within CPLR 214-a was an additional legislative mechanism to halt the malpractice crisis. See Governor's Memoranda,
supra note 3, reprintedin [1975] N.Y. LEGIs. ANN. 225; see also Daryl L. Jones, Note, Fein
v. Permanente Medical Group: The Supreme Court Uncaps the Constitutionalityof Statutory Limitations on Medical Malpractice Recoveries, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1075, 1083-86
(1986) (medical malpractice crisis legislation purposefully intended to stabilize insurance
rates to assure availability of health care to public).
The courts have overwhelmingly adhered to the legislative intent to limit the discovery
rule. See, e.g., Mitchell, 130 A.D.2d at 633-34, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 811 (suture material not
foreign object because of limitations imposed by CPLR 214-a); DiMarco v. Hudson Valley
Blood Servs., 141 Misc.2d 59, 60, 532 N.Y.S.2d 488, 489 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1988) (virus
contained in blood not what was intended as foreign object), rev'd on other grounds, 147
A.D.2d 156, 542 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1st Dep't 1989); Cooper, 75 A.D.2d at 758, 427 N.Y.S.2d at
811-12 (improper suture does not fall within exception of CPLR 214-a); cf. Goldsmith v.
Howmedica, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 120, 123, 491 N.E.2d 1097, 1098, 500 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641-42
(1986) (although CPLR 214-a not controlling, clear legislative intent not to extend exception
to prosthetic devices followed); see also CPLR 214-a commentary at 61-62 (McKinney supp.
1993) (Rodriguez decision fell in line with other Court of Appeals cases that took restrictive
approach to statute of limitations for medical malpractice purposes).
' Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 163, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 50 (quoting Rodriguez, 77 N.Y.2d at
224, 567 N.E.2d at 239, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 193).
42 See, e.g., Neil C. Abramson, Comment, A Right to Privacy Tour de Force Into Louisiana Medical Informed Consent, 51 LA. L. Rav. 755, 785 (1991). In dealing with the topic
of medical informed consent, the author noted that generally "[tihe legislature, rather than
the courts, is in a better position to assess the needs and interests of the people." Id.; Edward A. Lyon, Comment, The Right to Die: An Exercise of Informed Consent, Not an Extension of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1367, 1395 (1990)
("[M]edical ... questions ... are better regulated by legislation than by judicial decree.");
James T. Landenberger, et al., Case Comment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 201 (1984)
("[T]he legislature usually can investigate complex problems and balance conflicting inter-
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The Rockefeller court also neglected and misinterpreted judicial precedent established since the foreign object exception was
first enunciated in 1969. A study of these cases shows several attempts to expand the exception, many of which were disallowed by
the Court of Appeals.' 3 The Rodriguez decision provides the most
recent illustration of the Court of Appeals' reluctance to expand
the exception. Although the Rockefeller court did distinguish its
facts from Rodriguez," the court neglected the most important aspect of that decision: the limitation of the CPLR 214-a discovery
rule to cases involving foreign objects, other than those expressly
excepted by CPLR 214-a, which were unintentionally left within
the patient's body.' 5 The Court of Appeals should thus reverse the
ests better than a court can."); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462
U.S. 416, 456 n.4 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Irrespective of the difficulty of the task,
legislatures, with their superior fact finding capabilities, are certainly better able to make
the necessary judgments than are courts."); William A. Chittenden III, Malpractice and
Managed Health Care: History and Prognosis,26 TORTS & INS. L.J. 451 (1991) (thorough
discussion of competing issues and extent of medical malpractice); supra note 1 (discussing
state of health care crisis and contrary reports).
,3 See Rodriguez 77 N.Y.2d at 220-21, 567 N.E.2d at 237, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 195 (discussing efforts to expand discovery rule as enunciated in Flanagan).Several lower courts have
extended or attempted to extend the Flanagananalysis to cases involving a foreign object
that was either unintentionally or accidentally placed in a patient. See id.; Beary, 44 N.Y.2d
at 415, 377 N.E.2d at 459, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 15 (negligently performed tubal ligation discovered following emergency surgery for ectopic pregnancy); Smalls v. New York City Health &
Hosps. Corp., 55 A.D.2d 537, 538, 389 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (1st Dep't 1976), rev'd sub nom.
Beary, 44 N.Y.2d at 414, 377 N.E.2d at 459, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 15 (lesion caused by negligently
performed cervical myelogram); Dobbins v. Clifford, 39 A.D.2d 1, 2-3, 330 N.Y.S.2d 743,
746-47 (4th Dep't 1972) (damage to pancreas during course of operation to remove spleen);
Murphy v. St. Charles Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 64, 65, 312 N.Y.S.2d 978, 979-80 (2d Dep't 1970)
(malfunction in surgically implanted prosthetic device); cf. Famulare v. Huntington Hosp.,
78 A.D.2d 547, 547, 432 N.Y.S.2d 33, 33-34 (2d Dep't 1980) (fragment of broken tooth in
plaintiff's lip).
Such attempts by the lower courts to expand Flanagan were largely the reason that
CPLR 214-a explicitly excluded fixation devices from the discovery rule. See Rodriguez, 77
N.Y.2d at 220-21, 567 N.E.2d at 237, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 195. "Th[e] exclusion was inserted
specifically to overcome efforts by the intermediate appellate courts to expand Flanagan by
applying it to 'instances where fixation devices were inserted in a patient's body for the
purpose of treatment.'" Id. at 221, 567 N.E.2d at 238, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
Sach attempts to expand the discovery rule were also prevalent in cases concerning the
"continuous treatment" exception. See, e.g., Daniel J. v. New York City Health & Hosps.
Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 630, 634-35, 571 N.E.2d 704, 706-07, 569 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398-99 (1991); Rizk
v. Cohen, 73 N.Y.2d 98, 103-05, 535 N.E.2d 282, 284-86, 538 N.Y.S.2d 229, 231-33 (1989).
" See supra note 26 and accompanying text (outlining court's attempt to distinguish
Rockefeller from Rodriguez).
" See Rodriguez, 77 N.Y.2d at 221-22, 567 N.E.2d at 237-38, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 195-96.
The Rodriguez court's insistence that the foreign object exception be narrowly construed
was further evident when, in dicta, it stated: ". . . even if 'considerations similar to those
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Third Department's judgment and once again repel an impermissible expansion of the discovery rule.
Brian G. Friel

which motivated the court in Flanagan[clould be applied with like effect to the... different circumstances [presented here].' ....
The codification of the judicially created 'foreign
object' rule in CPLR 214-a precludes our adoption of a more flexible discovery rule ... ." Id.
at 223-24, 567 N.E.2d at 239, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 197 (quoting Beary, 44 N.Y.2d at 414, 377
N.E.2d at 459, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 15). The Rockefeller court neglected to adhere to this statement as evidenced by the court's reliance on the Flanaganfactors to support its holding.
See Rockefeller, 182 A.D.2d at 162-63, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 50.

